I. Introduction
As private health insurance is historically closely tied to employment in the United States, with almost 70 percent of nonelderly employees being covered by employer plans in 2010, 1 job separations have led to high rates of uninsurance (Gruber and Madrian 1997) . To bridge coverage gaps between jobs, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 requires most employers to offer coverage to formerly insured employees for up to 18 months after job termination. But few unemployed workers take up continuation coverage, likely because of its high cost, as COBRA does not require any employer contribution (Lambrew 2001) .
Despite several policy attempts to add health insurance assistance to unemployment benefits, no comprehensive COBRA subsidy was available until the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of February 2009. Under the ARRA, employer-insured workers who lost their jobs involuntarily between September 2008 and May 2010 could qualify for a 65 percent premium subsidy for up to 15 months. 2 This subsidy reduced the cost of COBRA considerably; on average, the subsidy totaled about $724 per month for family coverage and $261 per month for single coverage. 3 The amount is well within the range of subsidies provided through Affordable Care Act (ACA) Health Insurance Marketplaces, which gives a family of four earning 250 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) a 65 percent premium subsidy (Fernandez and Gabe 2012) . 4 We estimate the impact of the ARRA subsidy on health insurance take-up by comparing changes in own-name employer coverage (which is often called just "COBRA" when offered by a former employer) in periods when the subsidy is in effect to periods when the subsidy is absent, among the treatment group (former workers eligible for COBRA) relative to the changes among the control group (former workers ineligible for COBRA). We supplement this analysis by investigating the effect of the subsidy on uninsurance, and relatedly, whether there are spillover effects onto other forms of insurance. The use of a control group that also experienced involuntary job loss but was ineligible for COBRA (and thus ineligible for the subsidy) helps to account for contemporaneous trends in insurance coverage before and after the policy changes through a differencein-differences (DD) estimation strategy; we test beforehand whether insurance coverage of the control and treatment groups have trended similarly in periods when the subsidy is unavailable, and we also explore the use of alternative control groups. We conduct our empirical analysis using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative panel study of households with detailed information on insurance status and labor market characteristics that is uniquely suited for our analysis.
We find that the 65 percent premium subsidy is associated with a substantial increase in own-name employer coverage by those eligible for the subsidy, implying a price elasticity estimate of between −0.38 to −0.27, depending on the specification. This finding is somewhat higher than the elasticity estimates in the existing literature for both employer insurance and more recent non-group health insurance studies, although the literature has produced a wide range of estimates. We find evidence that the majority of this subsidy-induced take-up translated into a reduction in uninsurance but that the increase in own-name employer coverage was also partially offset by a decrease in non-group insurance.
The generous 2009 ARRA subsidy provides contemporary evidence on the price elasticity of demand for health insurance to inform ongoing policy discussions. Other than the extension of the tax deduction for health insurance to the self-employed (Gruber and Poterba 1994) , the ARRA was the only instance of a government premium subsidy for the individual purchase of health insurance prior to the ACA. 5 ACA Marketplaces provided subsidies of about $15 billion annually towards the purchase of non-group coverage for approximately eight million Americans in 2014 (CBO 2015; ASPE 2015) . Although research establishing the price responsiveness to current ACA subsidies will take time to evolve, debates on changes to financial incentives for individual health insurance have taken place even after ACA implementation (e.g., Supreme Court cases of 2012 and 2015 regarding the individual mandate and subsidies in Federal Marketplaces), and broadening the evidence base of existing elasticity studies serves well to inform these debates. This research is also relevant for assessing effectiveness of stimulus spending policies. Research to date shows that some ARRA stimulus programs increased economic activity on net while others simply caused intertemporal substitution in activity (e.g., Chodorow-Reich et al. 2012; Mian and Sufi 2012) .
II. Background: COBRA and the 2009 ARRA Subsidy
The COBRA of 1985 requires employers with 20 or more employees to make a worker's employer-provided health insurance coverage available for up to 18 months after job termination. Almost all states have extended these provisions to employers with fewer than 20 employees through "mini-COBRA" laws. 6 However, former employees who elect coverage must pay the entire premium, plus up to 2 percent more for administrative costs. Since the employers usually pay a portion of the premium for current employees, the premium under COBRA is four to six times the contribution individuals made while they were employed.
7 Although employer coverage is generally less expensive than private non-group health coverage, only about 19.4 percent of all eligible employees took up 5 An exception is a very limited subsidy through the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act (TAARA) of 2002 PL 107-210. 6 As of 2009, 40 states and the District of Columbia had expanded COBRA regulations to small employers (National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-cobra -expansions-for-small-businesses408.aspx, last accessed April 1, 2013). During our data period, Pennsylvania implemented a "mini-COBRA" law in June 2009 (Pennsylvania Act 2 of 2009) and Connecticut extended the maximum duration of COBRA coverage from 18 months to 30 months (Connecticut Public Act 10-13). Massachusetts provides health insurance assistance (either premium assistance or direct coverage) to unemployment insurance claimants whose family income is less than 400 percent of FPL through the Medical Security Program (MSP). The MSP was applicable to those who took up the ARRA subsidy, and it reduced the costs of COBRA coverage to 7 percent of the premium. Our results are robust to the exclusion of these states. 7 On average, the employer pays 83 percent of the premium costs for single coverage and 73 percent for family coverage (Kaiser/HRET 2009) , although in theory, employees pay the costs in their entirety through reduced wages to the extent they value those benefits (Summers 1989). COBRA, while 32.3 percent of eligible workers became uninsured, and the remainder obtained other forms of coverage.
8
Research on the effects of federal and state COBRA laws that exploits variation in the introduction date and the generosity of these laws across states and over time finds that the policy has increased private sources of coverage. Gruber and Madrian (1997) use those who lost their jobs and did not have employer insurance at their previous job as the control group and find, using the 1984-88 panels of the SIPP, that COBRA laws of one year reduce the probability of losing private insurance among those who lost a job and were eligible for COBRA by 4.2 percent (or 2.5 percentage points). This implies a price elasticity of demand for COBRA coverage of about −0.1 because, on average, non-group coverage tends to be about 40 percent more expensive than employer policies.
Many proposals have been advanced to increase the take-up of COBRA, such as offering subsidies, tax credits, and a loan program (CBO 1998; Rice 1999; Lemieux 2001; Gruber 2001) . The House and the Senate repeatedly considered proposals for premium subsidies for COBRA coverage between 1996 and 2001, but no such attempts became law.
9
The Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act (TAARA) of 2002 established a very limited health-care tax credit (HCTC) for the purchase of qualified health insurance by displaced workers, which includes COBRA coverage. It is mainly available to workers who can prove they have been adversely affected by foreign trade; according to GAO (2010) , total HCTC participation amounts to about 26,000 individuals per year.
The 2009 ARRA was the first policy measure aimed at increasing the take-up of COBRA coverage applicable to a broad population. Under this act, individuals were eligible for the 65 percent premium subsidy if they were COBRA eligible, lost their jobs involuntarily between September 1, 2008, and May 31, 2010, and if they were ineligible for other group health coverage (such as a spouse's or new employer's plan) or Medicare. Individuals were ineligible for the subsidy if their adjusted gross income was more than $145,000 (or $290,000 for joint filers); between $125,000 and $145,000 (or $250,000 and $290,000 for joint filers), the amount of the subsidy was phased out.
The ARRA premium subsidy became available on February 17, 2009, and could be drawn for up to 15 months. Those who lost their jobs before the ARRA but who became eligible for the subsidy retroactively (those who lost their jobs during September 1, 2008 , to February 17, 2009 were given a second chance to elect COBRA coverage. Employers were mandated by the ARRA to notify former employees of the subsidy, through which the individual paid 35 percent of the premium, while their former employers paid the remaining 65 percent and received federal tax credits as reimbursement.
8 This estimate comes from SIPP data, June 2010 to March 2012. Other forms of coverage are ESI in own name (through new employers) (30.7 percent), employer coverage as dependents (10.1 percent), non-group private insurance (5.1 percent), government-provided insurance (4.2 percent), and unknown sources (1.1 percent). Berger et al. (1999) estimate the COBRA take-up rate to be 24.6 percent using the April 1993 CPS Employee Benefit Supplement (this supplement is not available for more recent years). 9 See the Transitional Health Insurance for Workers Changing Jobs Act of 1996 , S. 2149 , 104th Cong. (1996 and the Economic Recovery and Assistance for American Workers Act of , S. 1732 , 107th Cong. (2001 .
Internal Revenue Service data show that two million households claimed the ARRA subsidy in 2009 (US Department of the Treasury 2010b), at a price tag to the government of $2 billion. This estimate may be imprecise because of multiple counting of employees across quarters; Fronstin (2010) estimates that 700,000 nonworking adults received the subsidy by August 2009. A study by the US Department of the Treasury (2010a), using a sample of unemployment insurance recipients in New Jersey, estimates that between 25 and 33 percent of those who were eligible for the subsidy elected COBRA coverage, while Graetz et al. (2012) estimate the COBRA take-up rate to have been 38 percent during the subsidy period, using survey data from Kaiser Permanente Northern California. In the only prior report that comments on the effect of the subsidy, Bovbjerg et al. (2010) use information from various convenience samples of employers and find that the takeup rate of COBRA was higher by 2 to 20 percentage points (depending on the employers studied) in the period with the subsidy compared with other periods. The wide range of estimates in these prior studies and the lack of an experimental study emphasize the need for research using national representative data and a quasi-experimental design.
III. Prior Studies on Price Elasticity of Demand for Health Insurance
During the past two decades, a sizable literature has estimated individual demand for health insurance and found a large range of elasticity estimates. These include a set of papers using employer-subsidized insurance as the context and a set that focuses on individually purchased insurance. Some studies use observed differences in prices, and others circumvent potential endogeneity problems with more exogenous tax-policy-based price differences or by asking willingness-to-pay survey questions.
The first strand of research exploited variation in employee contributions and concluded that in the context of employer-sponsored insurance, employees are fairly inelastic. Using data from the Small Business Benefit Survey conducted in seven cities in 1991-93, Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin (1997) examine the effect of employee out-of-pocket premium costs on the take-up of coverage among low-income single workers. They find small elasticity estimates of about −0.05. Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001) use nationally representative Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data with more control variables than used in Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin (1997) , to regress take-up as a function of employee contributions, but still conclude that employee elasticities are very low (−0.04). However, firms may set employee contributions to reflect worker demand for health insurance, making it hard to draw causal conclusions from such comparisons. Gruber and Washington (2005) overcome the hurdle of endogenous employee contributions by studying the introduction of tax deductibility for federal employee premium contributions. Using a detailed data set of all federal employees over 1991-2002, they estimate an elasticity in the range of −0.02. Although their paper is closer to a natural experiment study than earlier studies, some of their tax-price variation comes from state, time, and income differences across individuals. Moreover, a change in tax deductibility may not be perceived by the employee as a price reduction, and the authors conclude that "relative to a premium subsidy where all workers are fully aware and understand its savings implications, these estimated effects may be lower bounds" (Gruber and Washington 2005, 261) . Recent evidence from Germany shows that individual switching probabilities doubled when premium differences between plans are expressed in more salient terms (Schmitz and Ziebarth, forthcoming) .
By using responses to a benefits design survey, which asked workers at one firm whether they would accept health insurance at different employee prices, Royalty and Hagens (2005) provide another source of exogenous price variation and find an elasticity estimate that is small and statistically insignificant from zero. However, hypothetical questions lack external validity, and it is hard to generalize from one firm. All these studies of employer premiums discussed so far conclude that providing subsidies to those already offered generous coverage which they declined is not likely to elicit a response, but these studies suffer to varying degrees from problems of endogeneity, salience, or external validity.
Most studies of the price elasticity of demand for employer insurance use the employee portion of the premium as the relevant price that factors into the take-up decision, even though economists tend to agree that workers bear the full cost of their health insurance. Assuming that employee contributions are roughly 20-30 percent of total premiums, the price elasticity estimates in the employer literature will be 3.3 to 5 times larger if the total premium is used as the base. It is unclear how one should treat the full premium cost, but COBRA coverage may be viewed as closer to non-group coverage in this regard because former employees are responsible for the full premium. The literature studying non-employer-sponsored coverage has used changes in the federal tax deductibility of health insurance premiums for the self-employed, starting with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which allowed for a 25 percent deduction. Gruber and Poterba (1994) study how the change in tax price affects take-up among the self-employed compared with employed workers between 1985 and 1989 and find a high elasticity in the −3 to −1 range. The amount of the deduction increased in subsequent years to 30 percent by 1996 and then to 100 percent in 2003. Selden (2009) also uses those employed as a control group for the self-employed and continues to find high elasticity estimates in a similar range when using MEPS data for 1996-2004. Heim and Lurie (2009) use tax records of the self-employed to study the changes in the deduction during 1999-2003. They innovate by including individual-level fixed effects to control for selection into self-employment based on the deduction, and find that their estimates are halved from −0.6 to −0.3 by the use of fixed effects. Heim and Lurie (2009) also find that the deduction increases the amount of insurance purchased on the intensive margin as well. Gumus and Regan (2013) , the most recent paper in this strand of research, point out that Heim and Lurie's (2009) data only capture those who are self-employed by an income-based definition, and that individual tax data cannot correctly measure the right tax price applicable to the family. They reexamine the changes in premium deductibility for the self-employed from 1996 to 2003 using CPS data, and find no effect of the tax price on health insurance take-up. Thus, these studies initially suggested large elasticity estimates, which subsequent papers showed were likely overstated, and more recent studies show no or very small responsiveness among this population.
Although the use of tax-price variation solved potential problems inherent in the earlier literature, the self-employed and federal employees may not be representative of all workers or all those purchasing insurance on their own. A set of papers have also studied the individual health insurance market directly using methods other than taxprice variation (as tax deductibility of employer insurance does not extend to the individual market). Elasticity estimates in the range of −0.2 to −0.6 from three studies (Marquis and Long 1995; Marquis et al. 2004; CBO 2005) are used in the CBO simulation model underlying the ACA projections (CBO 2007, 21) . A challenge in this literature has been obtaining exogenous sources of variation in the price of non-group health insurance policies; even when prices are accurately observed, they could be correlated with the design of the insurance plan and enrollee characteristics. The studies address these issues by using regional variation in prices for a standard non-group insurance product across MSAs (Marquis and Long 1995) ; Marquis et al. (2004) push further by modeling changes in price of non-group coverage in California, and CBO (2005) instruments for price with state policy changes. The elasticity estimates obtained in these studies could possibly be biased because of plan detail inaccuracies in the available data and because prices could correlate with demand. Krueger and Kuziemko (2013) improve on prior studies by using self-reports of willingness-to-pay for health insurance among the uninsured and find an overall price elasticity estimate of −1.0. However, this study also suffers from the concerns in Royalty and Hagens (2005) in the use of hypothetical answers.
Thus, although the literature using employer data finds low elasticity estimates typically well below −0.1 and the individual market studies using observational data show medium-range elasticities in the −0.2 to −0.6 range, the literature using tax-price variation for the self-employed initially showed large estimates, which more recent studies place as closer to zero. Past studies have faced numerous estimation challenges and are based on small changes in price, 10 thus there is still a need for complementary ways to estimate demand, especially given the role of subsidy policy under the ACA.
IV. Hypotheses
To provide context for our hypotheses regarding the effect of the premium subsidy on the take-up of health insurance, we first discuss a conceptual framework for insurance decisions made by COBRA-eligible individuals. Individuals value the reduction in financial risks provided by health insurance and maximize their utility subject to the available set of insurance options, given exogenous individual characteristics that affect the demand and availability of insurance. The comprehensive set of other insurance options potentially available to COBRA-eligible individuals include coverage from a spouse's employer, purchasing unsubsidized private non-group health insurance, obtaining insurance from a new employer, obtaining public insurance, or becoming uninsured. We expect that ownname employer coverage from former employers would increase substantially because of the ARRA's 65 percent price reduction.
11 The only alternative source of coverage we expect to decrease unambiguously in response to the ARRA subsidy is non-group coverage, which is more expensive than COBRA for a policy of similar quality. We may also see some reduction in other forms of coverage, but generally those are much lower in marginal costs to the enrollee than COBRA, and thus we think this unlikely to change at the margin because of the subsidy.
V. Data
We examine the impact of the ARRA subsidy on insurance outcomes using data from Waves 1-11 of the 2008 SIPP panel, which conducted longitudinal interviews with approximately 50,000 households between August 2008 and March 2012. The SIPP sample is divided into four rotation groups, and each rotation group is interviewed in different months. As a consequence, every four months, a quarter (each rotation group) of SIPP respondents are asked about their insurance and job status in the current and past three months. Because of concerns about recall bias, we only use insurance information pertaining to the interview month. Although job loss could occur at any time in our survey, we must verify that an individual held employer coverage while employed to know their COBRA eligibility status. We measure whether own-name employer coverage was held by the end of the wave in which an individual lost his or her job, which allows us to study take-up within the first four months after job loss. The ARRA subsidy was available only to those who lost jobs involuntarily, so all other job loss cases are removed from our data set using a variable that asks about the reason for job loss. Since August 2008 is the earliest month for which the insurance information is available in our data set, we can follow job losses that occur from September 2008 onwards; the earliest month we observe insurance among those eligible for COBRA is by the next interview date, in December 2008. Since the ARRA subsidy was available to those who lost their jobs involuntarily between September 2008 and May 2010, our data set contains job losses of all those eligible for the subsidy and also job losses occurring during a two-year period after the subsidy ended.
12
Monthly information on health insurance status enables us to measure the impact of the fraction of those purchasing employer plans. To the extent that the subsidy may change which of the offered plans is chosen by workers, we think this would be part of how a subsidy affects insurance take-up (for a review, see Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000) . It is also possible that a subsidy reduces any premium assistance that employers might have provided through severance packages, although our search for such details to the best of our ability does not suggest employers typically provide this type of unemployment assistance. 12 We considered appending the 2004 SIPP panel to the 2008 panel to include the period prior to the start of the subsidy so that our DD estimate could contain two nonsubsidy periods, but we discovered that some key variables measuring COBRA appeared to have changed in processing between panels. We confirmed this with SIPP administrative staff, and decided that while we cannot append the data sets for our DD estimate, we can use the 2004 panel to examine trends in outcomes for treatment and control groups during another nonsubsidy period to judge whether the control group can serve as appropriate counterfactuals; we present results of these confirmatory tests later.
subsidy more precisely than information from other surveys, such as the CPS, which contains only yearly information.
13

VI. Method
To understand how the ARRA subsidy provision affects take-up of targeted health insurance, we compare own-name employer coverage when the subsidy is in effect to when the subsidy is absent, among the population eligible for subsidy (our COBRA-eligible treatment group), to the employer coverage rate of a control group of those who lost a job involuntarily but did not hold own-name employer coverage prior to job loss and are thus ineligible for COBRA. We also separately examine the effect of the subsidy on employerdependent coverage, non-group private coverage, and government-provided coverage using the same DD design, to investigate substitution effects. The ARRA subsidy became available on February 17, 2009, and those who lost their jobs during September 1, 2008 , to February 17, 2009 , became eligible for the subsidy only retroactively. Because we examine insurance status only on the next interview date after the job loss occurred, our data set includes some individuals who would later be eligible for the subsidy retroactively but whose insurance take-up was measured in our analysis before they learned of the subsidy, and we must ensure that these individuals are not considered "treated." For example, we measure employer insurance at the next interview date (in this case, December 2008, before the subsidy was announced) of SIPP first-rotation individuals who lost their jobs in September 2008 to December 2008. These individuals, and all other COBRA-eligible individuals whose insurance take-up is measured when the subsidy is not in effect, are considered not treated, and compared with those COBRA-eligible individuals whose insurance is measured when the subsidy is in effect, and with non-COBRA-eligible individuals.
We expect that the ARRA subsidy affects only those who are eligible for COBRA, but given that our identification only comes from comparing take-up between time periods, the use of a control group is very important for disentangling the policy effect from other changes over time that affected unemployed workers, such as fewer job opportunities in tight labor markets, as well as the declining take-up of employer insurance in general (Vistnes et al. 2012 ). Gruber and Madrian (1997) use the same control group as ours (those losing jobs at the same time but not eligible for COBRA) in their study of the effect of the COBRA law itself. Our empirical specification further adjusts for confounding effects of the economic climate by including the state monthly unemployment rate as a regressor.
While Gruber and Madrian (1997) study any private insurance coverage as their outcome because they lack more detailed data, we examine own-name employer insurance. Although we expect the subsidy to affect only COBRA coverage, we use own-employer insurance for two reasons-one is to have a consistently defined dependent variable for the control and treatment groups, and the other is that, as mentioned by Gruber and Madrian (1997) , those with COBRA may mistakenly consider it own-name employer coverage from a current employer in the SIPP. We have also conducted our analysis using only (selfreported) COBRA coverage for the treatment group, and find that results are very similar when we do this as well as when we estimate a "single difference" study without a control group. When we present elasticity estimates, we consider the magnitudes from all three specifications. We also consider the use of an alternative plausible control group to verify that our results are not sensitive to the choice of our main control group. This new group is composed of those who held employer coverage at the same time as the COBRA-eligible worker, but did not lose a job during the subsidy period.
14 Prior to estimating the DD models, we formally test that the time trends in all outcomes are not statistically different between the treatment and control groups during the period when the subsidy is not in effect, as this would add to our confidence regarding the appropriateness of the DD design.
We obtain a DD estimate of the effect of the subsidy on COBRA coverage by a regression of the following form: We use several other control variables that help us isolate the effect of the subsidy through the specification above. Z ist represents demographic and socioeconomic characteristics for the individuals that capture demand for health insurance, and includes measures for age and its square term, gender, race/ethnicity, marital status, highest education attained, and whether the individual has children younger than 18 years old. J ist−1 represents job characteristics during the previous wave, which pertain to the job that was lost. The variables included are log of hourly wage, union membership, length of job tenure, industry fixed effects, and occupation fixed effects. 15 Including job characteristics as well as individual demographic and socioeconomic characteristics is important because these 14 We considered other alternative control groups but abandoned their use because of small samples, measurement issues in the SIPP, or lack of likely comparability to the treatment group: those who were eligible for COBRA coverage and lost their jobs voluntarily; those who work for small firms in the 10 states that did not extend the COBRA law to them; and those who lost jobs involuntarily and were eligible for COBRA but income ineligible for the ARRA premium subsidy. 15 See Tables 1 and 2 in the Online Appendix (see http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162 /AJHE a 00047) for details about industry and occupation categories included in the analysis.
are highly correlated with the demand for health insurance. Unemp st is the monthly state unemployment rate, which captures economic conditions at the local level. Improved economic conditions could make the individuals more likely to take up coverage because their prospect of future income is higher. UB st is the number of weeks of unemployment benefits available in the state at the time of job loss, which is publicly available from the Department of Labor. We expect that availability of unemployment benefits, which changed during this time period, may influence take-up of insurance coverage among those who have lost their jobs. For example, those who are eligible for longer periods of unemployment benefits may decide to seek insurance relative to those who expect their job search period will need to be shorter because of limited unemployment benefits eligibility. We include state fixed effects (ξ s ) to control for time-invariant state-specific characteristics, and we control for time and seasonality fixed effects (θ t ) through indicator variables for each quarter and for each year.
We use block-bootstrapped standard errors blocked at the time (year-month) level following Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) to account for the fact that our identification comes from the trends between only two groups, the treatment and control individuals. 16 We use a linear probability model for ease of interpretation, although the results hold qualitatively when we use both logit and probit models. All results presented are estimated with survey weights.
VII. Results
A. G R A P H I C A L P R E S E N T A T I O N A N D T R E N D S T E S T S
As an initial approach to investigating the difference in own-name employer coverage for those losing jobs in the periods with and without the subsidy, for the treatment group relative to the control group, we plot conditional time trends in Figure 1 . Figure 2 shows corresponding trends for any coverage. We obtained these estimates from a regression that includes individual demographic, socioeconomic, and job characteristics, the state unemployment rate, and the state maximum weeks of unemployment benefits available. Each data point of the solid and dashed lines in Figure 1 represents the own-name employer insurance take-up rate by the date of job loss, averaged at the half-year level, for the treatment and control groups separately. The first (dotted) vertical line represents those losing jobs during the second half of 2008. During this period, about 20 percent of individuals in the treatment group were eligible for the ARRA subsidy when their take-up was measured, while the remaining 80 percent represented by this point are considered ineligible. That is, of those losing jobs in September to December 2008, only those who lost their 16 An exception is our subgroup analysis shown in Table 3 , where we used cluster-corrected standard errors at the time (year-month) level because some sample sizes are too small to support estimation by block bootstrap. We also calculated cluster-corrected standard errors for all other tables (results available upon request), and confirmed that the results are almost identical between these two methods. We prefer blockbootstrapped standard errors when feasible because they employ weaker assumptions than cluster-corrected standard errors. jobs in November or December of 2008 stand a chance to have their insurance measured at a time when they knew they were eligible for the subsidy (if their next interview date is after February 17, 2009), and these individuals amount to 20 percent of all individuals in the treatment group who lost their jobs in this half-year. 17 The vast majority (about 85
17 An alternative way to draw Figure 1 is to include only those who are eligible for the subsidy in the points before the second half of 2010. We decided to include all individuals, as the figure tells the same story in this format, and highlights the way the treatment effect is captured in our data.
F I G U R E 2 . Conditional rate of any insurance coverage, treatment and control groups, 2008-12
Notes: (1) See notes (1) and (3) under Figure 1 . (2) We use information on any insurance coverage collected in the most recent reference month of the wave during which job termination occurred. We regress an indicator for any insurance coverage on the same variables mentioned in note (2) under Figure 1. percent) of the individuals losing jobs in the first half of 2009 were interviewed at a time when they knew they were eligible for the subsidy. The second vertical line represents those losing jobs in the first half of 2010, where the vast majority of them were eligible for the COBRA subsidy (all but the June 2010 job losses) regardless of when their insurance outcomes are measured. Among those losing jobs during the second half of 2010 and beyond, no one is eligible for the subsidy. Figure 1 shows that own-name employer insurance increased between the second half of year 2008 and the first half of 2009 as more individuals represented by these dots became eligible for the ARRA subsidy, and the rate stayed high between the second half of 2009 and the first half of 2010 when almost all the individuals represented by these dots were eligible for the subsidy. The rate decreased sharply in the second half of 2010 when none of the individuals were eligible for the subsidy and stayed low afterwards. During the whole study period, the own-name employer insurance rate for the control group showed a steady and slightly decreasing trend. Our use of DD strategy should remove any common effects that occur in workplaces and labor markets nationwide, for example, in reaction to national changes in the cost of health insurance and the demand for labor.
We formally test whether the difference in insurance trends between the treatment and control groups during the period of the 2008 SIPP panel with no subsidy is statistically significant by regressing take-up rates on a linear time trend, an indicator for the treatment group, an interaction of these terms, and other control variables included in our main specification. The first set of rows in the first column of Table 3 in the Online Appendix shows that the coefficient of an interaction of the linear time trend and an indicator for the treatment group is not statistically significant and that the coefficient magnitude is small. We further test whether the trends differ between the two groups during the 2004 panel, which was conducted from January 2004 to December 2007, prior to the subsidy. The second set of rows in the first column of Online Appendix Table 3 shows, reassuringly, that the difference in trends is small and not statistically significant during the 2004 panel as well. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of key control variables for the treatment and control groups, for those losing jobs when the subsidy is in effect and when it is absent. There are only fairly small differences between time periods in individual characteristics (in marital status and education), which reduce the concerns that those losing jobs inside and outside the subsidy periods may be very different along observable factors. Although we noted that trends in insurance outcomes between treatment and control group individuals are similar during periods without a subsidy, there are time-invariant differences between control and treatment group in almost all measured characteristics-all individual characteristics means are statistically significantly different (significance levels not shown). The individuals in the control group tend to be younger, female, Hispanic, single, and childless; to not be a member of a trade union; and to have less education, a lower hourly wage, and less job tenure, when compared with the treatment group. Individuals in these two groups have similar state unemployment rates associated with their observations, but the number of weeks of unemployment benefits available at the time of job loss was longer among the control group than among the treatment group. While these differences are not surprising, they emphasize the importance of controlling for individual characteristics in our regression model. The first column of Table 2 shows the effect of the ARRA subsidy on own-name employer insurance using our DD strategy. The first row presents the estimates without controls for observable characteristics, and the second to fourth rows present the estimates with control variables gradually added (the fourth row corresponds to equation 1). Adding control variables does not affect the magnitudes of the effects in a meaningful way, which is reassuring. In results not reported, we added a further interaction between the state unemployment rate and the treatment group indicator, and found our results were largely unchanged. The estimate with all controls shows that the implementation of the ARRA subsidy is associated with a 5.4 percentage point increase in the own-name employer takeup rate. Dependent variable means are presented in the bottom part of the table. The mean employer insurance rate when the subsidy is not available is 0.439; since we judge the elasticity with respect to the COBRA subsidy, we also present the COBRA rate among the treatment group, which is 0.221. The 5.4 percentage point increase amounts to a 24.4 percent increase from the base COBRA rate among the treatment group, and this in turn implies a −0.38 price elasticity of demand, as the subsidy reduces the price by 65 percent. We present alternative methods of calculating elasticity estimates in the sensitivity analysis section, where we find a range of −0.38 to −0.27. (2) a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.10 indicate that means differ in a two-tailed t-test between the first column and the second column, with corresponding statistical significance as aforementioned respectively.
B. R E G R E S S I O N R E S U L T S
T A B L E 1 . Means of demographic, socioeconomic, and job characteristics
C. S U B G R O U P A N A L Y S I S
In Table 3 , we analyze whether the subsidy had different impacts on own-name employer coverage among subgroups that likely differ in their demand for such coverage and may respond differently to a subsidy. We perform this analysis by running a regression separately for each subgroup, defined along income and health status. First, we separate the observations into those with current (post job loss) monthly family income <138 percent, 138-400 percent, and >400 percent of FPL, to have roughly equally sized groups as well as to stay close to relevant policy parameters: ACA Medicaid eligibility ends at 138 percent of FPL, and the Marketplace subsidies phase out completely at 400 percent of FPL. About a quarter of the sample has an income above 400 percent of FPL. The first set of rows shows that the effect of the subsidy is not statistically significant for those whose current income is below 138 percent of FPL, but becomes statistically significant and larger in size for those in the 138-400 percent of FPL and for those whose income is more than 400 percent of FPL. The subsidy increased own-name employer coverage by 6.1 percentage points (26.7 percent) among those with income 138-400 percent of FPL and by 16.8 percentage points (69.0 percent) among those with current income more than 400 percent of FPL. This indicates price elasticity estimates of −0.41 and −1.06, respectively. Those with low incomes may not respond to a subsidy because the absolute costs are still high and there may be public sources of coverage available to some family members. Our results suggest that the price elasticity among subpopulations eligible for the Marketplace subsidies could be higher than the elasticity among lower-income groups; this price elasticity could be amplified in the presence of fines for being uninsured applicable after 2014. While we do not see the expected effect of diminishing elasticity at the highest income levels, this turning point may occur at levels much higher than four times the poverty level.
The second set of rows shows the effects of the ARRA subsidy by health status. COBRA coverage is subject to adverse selection: a survey finds that health-care costs for COBRA enrollees are about 150 percent of that of active employees in 2008 (Spencer and Associates 2009) . Previous reports raise the possibility that subsidies for COBRA coverage could alleviate adverse selection because the lower price might induce those with lower marginal benefit to elect coverage (Fronstin 1998) . On the other hand, even the subsidy may still elicit less take-up response among the healthy than the sick. Since the SIPP does not contain information on chronic health conditions in any waves, we use a self-reportedhealth variable that takes values of "excellent," "very good," "good," "fair," and "poor." We find the subsidy significantly increases own-name employer coverage by 5.9 percentage points (25.5 percent) among those whose reported health is less than "excellent," while the effect is not significant among those whose reported health is "excellent." The difference in coefficients between these subgroups, however, is not statistically significant and the results are somewhat sensitive to the exact thresholds of self-reported health status we use to separate the groups.
D. A N A L Y S I S O F A N Y C O V E R A G E A N D O T H E R I N S U R A N C E O U T C O M E S
Estimating the effect of the ARRA premium subsidy on the probability of having any insurance coverage is helpful in understanding the overall success of the stimulus spending. Individuals could substitute away from other coverage to own-name employer coverage because of the subsidy, or move from being uninsured to insured. Our analysis of any coverage and other types of coverage is a straightforward extension of our initial DD framework, and uses the same specification as equation 1. Figure 2 shows the rates of any insurance coverage among the treatment group (represented by a solid line) and control group (represented by a dashed line). Each data point represents the rate of any coverage, within four months of job loss, for those who lost jobs during the half-year. The rates trend similarly between the treatment and control groups during the subsidy period, but the treatment group rate goes down after the subsidy ended at the end of the first half of 2010 and stays lower for the rest of the time, while the control group rate stays almost the same throughout the study period. The second to fifth columns of Online Appendix Table 3 confirm that the difference in trends between the groups is small and not statistically significant for any coverage as well as the rates of employerdependent coverage, non-group coverage, and government-provided coverage during the period of the 2008 panel without the subsidy and also during the 2004 panel.
The second column of Table 2 indicates that the implementation of the subsidy is associated with a 4.4 percentage point increase in any source of insurance coverage (p < 0.10). This is equivalent to an 11.5 percent decrease in uninsurance from its baseline of 0.38 (1 − 0.62 since means shown are for the complement of uninsurance) when the subsidy is not available. This finding suggests that the premium subsidy decreased uninsurance among the treatment group. However, part of the increase in COBRA coverage was offset by a decrease in the availability of other sources of coverage. The third to fifth columns show that while the effects on employer-dependent coverage and on government-provided coverage are statistically insignificant, non-group insurance decreases by 2.2 percentage points (52.0 percent).
VIII. Sensitivity Analysis
We test the stability of our elasticity parameters first by considering alternative specifications. In the main specification, we define our dependent variable as an indicator for being covered by own-name employer insurance and zero otherwise, because we use a control group of those who are not eligible for COBRA and following the measurement error reasons in Gruber and Madrian (1997) . Since this measure includes not just COBRA coverage but also own-name employer coverage through new employers, our main estimates could reflect spillover effects in reemployment. We address this concern by slightly changing our outcome variable: in this alternative specification, the outcome variable takes a value of one among the treatment group only if they have COBRA coverage per se, while the control group dependent variable is unchanged. The second column of Table 4 in the Online Appendix shows that our DD estimate using this specification is 0.049, which is slightly smaller but not statistically different from our main estimate. This coefficient estimate indicates a 22.1 percentage point increase in COBRA coverage, and we obtain a price elasticity estimate of −0.34 this way, compared with the −0.38 estimate in our main specification.
Our main specification uses a control group that also separates from employers, but who did not receive employer insurance while they were employees. Next, we use an alternative control group of those who had insurance from their employers at the time that the treatment group lost their job, but this new control group remained continuously employed. Since such individuals could differ in many aspects from the individuals in our treatment group and because there are a large number of such workers, we used propensity score matching and chose individuals who were similar in terms of observable characteristics used as control variables in our main specification (only the weeks of unemployment benefits variable is not included since this variable is not relevant to the propensity of losing jobs involuntarily among those with employer insurance in the previous wave). This approach allows us to separate out contemporaneous time trends in employer-related coverage; the individuals in this alternative control group likely faced a similar fear of losing their jobs and income as the individuals in our treatment group and made their insurance choices accordingly during the economic downturns. Our outcome variable now takes a value of one if individuals in the treatment group have own-name employer coverage through their former employers or if individuals in this alternative control group have own-name employer coverage through their current employers, and takes a value of zero otherwise. The third column of Table 4 in the Online Appendix shows that the ARRA subsidy is associated with an increase of 4.2 percentage points in COBRA coverage among the treatment group relative to the alternative control group. This DD estimate suggests a price elasticity estimate of −0.29, which is somewhat smaller than the −0.38 estimate from the main specification.
Finally, we ran a single-difference regression, in which we compare the COBRA takeup in the period when the subsidy was in effect to the COBRA take-up in the period after the subsidy ended, among the treatment group. We included all the control variables used in our main specification (except time fixed effects that are highly collinear with an indicator variable for the subsidy period) to capture any compositional changes between these two periods among the treatment group. The fourth column of Table 4 in the Online Appendix shows that the ARRA subsidy increased COBRA coverage by 3.9 percentage points (17.8 percent), although this is significant only at the 10 percent level. This implies a price elasticity estimate of −0.27. The single-difference strategy yields a smaller estimate (although not statistically significantly different from our main specification) possibly because we could not account for the general decreasing trend in employer insurance. We noted that SIPP does not cover the first half of the year 2008. There is no other data set that allows us to identify the treatment group of those who have coverage through a former employer and are ARRA-subsidy eligible. However, CPS allows us to look at a similar concept. We look at own-name coverage through "former or current employer" for those who report themselves as unemployed for 16 weeks (close to our SIPP definition). Figure 3 shows that the pattern of coverage is very consistent with our results. The rate of those who reported having own-name employer coverage is high in the year 2009, when the subsidy was available for a majority of the year.
Although we have estimated our model using a linear probability specification for ease of interpretation, we also estimate equation 1 using both probit and logit nonlinear specifications. We obtain implied marginal effects of similar magnitude as the linear estimates shown in Table 2 ; for example, the marginal effect on own-name employer coverage is estimated as 0.055 and 0.054 when using probit and logit models, respectively, and these estimates are almost or exactly the same as the estimate obtained in Table 2 and are significant at the 5 percent level.
IX. Discussion and Conclusion
Although there were several calls for policies to assist with health insurance costs for the unemployed (e.g., CBO 1998; Families USA 2009), no such provision existed until the 2009 ARRA premium subsidy. Even though this policy ended in 2010, the ACA now provides premium assistance for COBRA-eligible workers under 400 percent of FPL in the form of Marketplace subsidies, and our estimates help predict insurance responses.
18 COBRA itself still remains relevant in the post-ACA time period, as about a quarter of job losers in our sample have incomes above 400 percent of FPL. In this paper, we analyze the effects of this 65 percent ARRA subsidy and find that it led to substantially increased health insurance take-up, implying price elasticity estimates of −0.38 to −0.27. These numbers are somewhat larger than those emerging from prior papers, suggesting that consumers may be more price sensitive than a close read of the literature might otherwise predict. We find evidence that uninsurance decreased as a result of the stimulus policy, but that the increase in continuation coverage was also partially offset by a decrease in non-group insurance.
Our research contributes to a better understanding of consumer responses to government-subsidized private health insurance and discussions surrounding Affordable Care Act (ACA) policies. In addition to the recent US Supreme Court cases that discussed financial incentives for private insurance in the form of the individual mandate, and subsidies on Federally Facilitated Marketplaces, we are likely to see continued debates on the use of premium subsidies as a policy tool, even before price responsiveness evidence from the ACA has evolved. Our paper broadens the base of existing studies that inform these debates. This work also adds to papers that evaluate the effectiveness of stimulus spending policies, such as the ARRA's increased Medicaid matching funds, the first-time homebuyer tax credit, or the "cash for clunkers" program (Brogaard and Roshak 2011; Chodorow-Reich et al. 2012; Mian and Sufi 2012) .
When using estimates from this research to inform health policy discussions, one must consider the limits to generalizing from the ARRA experience. The price elasticity magnitude could depend on several factors that differ between the COBRA setting, and for example, those of the ACA. First, COBRA coverage is intended to bridge a gap in insurance coverage caused by job termination. Because of its temporary nature, the demand for COBRA coverage could be low compared with more permanent coverage. Second, those eligible for the ARRA subsidy are likely to have experienced a recent loss of income, and this could reduce their responsiveness to the subsidy. If employers had decided to lay off their workers just before the date when the subsidy ended, knowing that the workers could benefit from the ARRA subsidy, this could bias our estimate in an unknown direction if these workers are systematically different. We find that in our sample there is no evidence of a change in the number of involuntarily lost jobs around the time when the subsidy ended, which is reassuring. Third, the types of individuals who are generally seeking coverage in the non-group market could differ substantially from those individuals who have had employer coverage while employed, as is the case for those eligible for COBRA.
Aside from providing data for studying the elasticity of demand for health insurance, the ARRA premium subsidy presents an opportunity to explore several other behaviors related to health and labor economics. It is well established that generous unemployment benefits can reduce job search efforts and prolong the period of unemployment (Mortensen 1977; Krueger and Mueller 2010) . Subsidies to search could also lead to better eventual job matches because workers would be less likely to settle for the first jobs they are offered (Gruber and Madrian 1997) . Given the close relationship between labor market participation and health insurance, the effect of the ARRA subsidy on labor market outcomes remains an important topic for future study.
